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MARRIAGE AND PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE
ROBERT F. NAGEL*
One strain of conservative thought, traceable to Michael
Oakeshott and (before him) Edmund Burke,' tends to be positive
about the past and present while being pessimistic about change in the
future. Enlightenment liberals, on the other hand, tend to be deeply
dissatisfied with the past and present while being optimistic about
change in the future. These tendencies are often taken to reflect either
differences in moral sensibility or, at least, differences in psychological
disposition.
Traditionalist and liberal tendencies can more usefully be traced
to distinct ways of understanding the world. Oakeshott, for instance,
distinguished between rationalism and practical knowledge.2
Rationalism, as he described it, is committed to the proposition that
knowledge arises principally from individual intellectual effort.'
Practical knowledge, in contrast, is knowledge that arises from
participation in an activity.4 Rationalists, then, will tend to be
inattentive to the particulars of human practices and relatively
sanguine about the possibility of improvement Traditionalists like
Oakeshott will tend to be appreciative of the complexity of human
activities and distrustful of the capacity of individual human minds to
make helpful changes.6 What we often take to be differences between
liberals and conservatives, in short, arises from opposite views on the
relationship between activity and knowledge.
* Mr. Robert F. Nagel is the Rothgerber Professor of Constitutional Law at the
University of Colorado Law School. Mr. Nagel is a widely published and acclaimed author,
focusing on the interplay between American culture and the judiciary.
1. Amy L. Wax provides an interesting discussion of the relationship between the
thinking of both Burke and Oakeshott and the institution of marriage in The
Conservative's Dilemma: TraditionalInstitutions, Social Change, and Same-Sex Marriage,
42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1059 (2005).

2. See MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, Rationalism in
POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 1, 7-8 (1962).
3.

Politics, in RATIONALISM IN

See MICHAEL OAKESHOTr, Rational Conduct, in RATIONALISM IN POLITICS
ESSAYS, supra note 2, at 80, 85-86.
OAKESHOTr, supra note 2, at 8.
OAKESHOTr, supra note 3, at 84-85.
OAKESHOTT, supra note 2, at 10.
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I will begin by explaining more fully what Oakeshott meant by
rationalism and practical knowledge. I will then apply the distinction
to the issue of homosexual marriage. Traditionalist understandings do
not inevitably lead to the conclusion that such an alteration in the
institution of marriage would be unwise, but they do help identify the
kinds of concerns that proponents should be willing to address.
A rationalist, according to Oakeshott, values individual
intellectual effort Under this view, the ideal is for a human mind,
situated outside of an activity, to define the purpose of the activity and
then propose changes that will better achieve that purpose. Oakeshott
gave as an example the design of bloomers as a way to enable women
to ride bicycles. 8 A rationalist designer would start by thinking that the
object of riding is mobility, and such a designer would conceive of
bloomers as simply a way to enable women to move more freely on a
bicycle. Oakeshott's objection to this kind of thinking was not that it is
wrong or useless; indeed, as the example of bloomers suggests, he
thought that some degree of rationalism is inevitable and can be
useful.9 (Reading cookbooks is useful too, but it is not the same thing
as knowing how to cook.) Oakeshott's objection to rationalism was
that it is an incomplete form of knowledge. 0 A person committed to
rationalism as an ideal, therefore, is committed to misunderstanding
the nature of the activity in which he is engaged.
The designer of bloomers was not in fact working from outside
the practice of bicycle riding nor merely attempting to improve female
mobility. Bicycle riding, of course, is an activity with a history and it is
situated within other activities that have histories. Bloomers
represented an effort to improve mobility while not departing too far
from the aesthetic and moral standards of the times. A garment aimed
more narrowly at mobility might have looked like the Lycra outfits
worn by so many riders in my town of Boulder, but even these are
reflections of developments in fashion, modern expectations about sex
roles, changes in technology, and other cultural developments. The
design of athletic clothing, which must ultimately find favor with those
who actually participate in athletics, is not an isolated and abstract
intellectual activity (though it is that to a degree), but an aspect of a
collective activity where understanding and judgment are based on a
history of engagement with sport. A designer who appreciated this
7.

8.
9.
10.

See OAKESHOTT, supra note 3, at 81.

See id. at 81.
See id. at 95-96.
OAKESHOTr, supranote 2, at 12.
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would use rationalism but would not be confined by it. Such a
designer would be using practical knowledge in that his thinking,
while a "reflection upon conduct," would not be separate from
conduct."
The rationalist, who is searching for the vindication of individual
intellect, is represented in our time by the image of Justice Harry
Blackmun sitting in an office somewhere, writing out a draft of Roe v.
Wade. 2 Blackmun had to reduce the number of objectives to be
served by abortion regulation to two, medical safety and protecting
potential life, because any recognition of the possible range and interrelatedness of the state's interests would have made a simple solution,
such as his trimester scheme, impossible. 3 He had to convert a moral
interest in protecting the value of human life into an interest in
protecting the lives of persons in the full sense of the word;' in this
way, the state's purpose would be independent of the means chosen to
achieve that purpose, making the mental effort of testing the law's
rationality possible. He had to find the legal history of abortion
regulation, as well as the whole history of human thought on abortion,
inconclusive because he needed to clear the decks for the imposition
of a resolution that his own mind had generated. 5 He had to demand
empirical evidence of the relationship between means and ends
because the rationalist resists uncertainty and indefiniteness. His
resolution to admittedly difficult moral issues had to be reducible to a
simple set of propositions (or, in Oakeshott's terminology, doctrines
or maxims) 6 so that progress could go forward unhindered by
complexity or subtlety.
Appreciation for practical knowledge does not necessarily mean,
of course, that Blackmun was entirely wrong about abortion. Nor does
it mean that the institution of marriage ought never to be changed to
include homosexual relationships. It does mean, however, that such a
change should not be imposed by courts because, as I have argued
elsewhere, modern judges in general are thoroughly committed to the
intellectual framework of rationalism. 7 It also means that the change
ought not to be imposed by Congress because ideological thinking,
which is rationalism on a grand scale, so dominates there.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

OAKESHOTr, supra note 3, at 90.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See id. at 162-64.
See id. at 162-63.
See id. at 156-62.
See OAKESHOTr, supranote 2, at 10.
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See ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES 120 (1989).

SO UTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:37

Additionally, the libertarian solution of leaving the decision up to
individuals is inconsistent with the activity of marriage as we have
known it because marriage has public purposes and, therefore,
necessarily involves some regulation by the states. If, however,
substantial numbers of homosexuals were to live as couples, raise
children, and otherwise approximate the state of marriage, other
members of the community might gradually find the arguments for
gay marriage to be backed by relevant experience and therefore
compelling. In this way, marriage understood as an activity sanctioned
by law might evolve to include homosexuals.
At present, however, the practical argument against gay marriage
begins with two weighty facts. First, at least as far as I know, except
for a few modern departures, marriage has been thought of and
conducted as a heterosexual practice across human history and in
most, if not all, human cultures; 8 and, second, marriage is
undoubtedly a foundational institution that serves such absolutely
basic purposes as socializing children, domesticating young men, and
protecting women during childbearing years. 9 The ubiquity of
heterosexual marriage means that virtually all of those who have been
in married relationships and those who have been close to married
relationships-in widely different times and circumstances-have
understood heterosexuality to be an important, perhaps a necessary,
component of marriage. They do not understand this in an abstract
way. They understand it as an inherent aspect of a way of living. The
foundational nature of marriage means that the risks to society
involved in disregarding this understanding would be far-reaching.
Deeply embedded, foundational social institutions have been
successfully reformed before, and the human mind has certainly been
willing to attempt it with the institution of marriage. And it is true that
the arguments for legal authorization of gay marriage seem
reasonable and even humane. It is said that one main purpose of
marriage is to allow love to flourish and that homosexuals are as
capable of loving relationships as are heterosexuals. ° It is said that
another purpose of marriage is to raise children and (again) that
homosexuals are capable of raising children.2 It is said that marriage
entails certain legal benefits and that homosexuals deserve such

18. Monte Neil Stewart, MarriageFacts, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 313,321 (2008).
19. See id. at 321-22.
20. See id. at 329.
21. See William Meezan & Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage,Same-Sex Parenting,and
America's Children, 15 FUT. CHILD. 97, 97 (2005).
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benefits in the same way as heterosexuals do. It is said that marriage
promotes stability and monogamy, and homosexuals can benefit from
both. And, finally, it is said that authorizing homosexual marriage
24
will not reduce the status of the institution or discourage its use.
I am not sure, however, that these arguments come to grips with
the doubts held by many and that arise, I think, from long experience
with marriage as a personal and social activity. Consider, for example,
the demand by reformers for empirical verification of the claims of
traditionalists. 2 Reformers say that to justify separate treatment of
homosexual marriage there must be evidence that child-rearing by
homosexuals is less effective than child-rearing by heterosexuals.2 6
They say that to justify heterosexual marriage there must be evidence
from experimental systems in Europe that authorizing homosexual
marriage encourages divorce or child-rearing outside of marriage.
And so on. Of course, such evidence would be relevant and useful.
But focusing too intensely on systematic studies can create a false
sense of certainty. The results of studies can and do change.
Moreover, many important social and psychological phenomena are
not susceptible to accurate measurement because they are too subtle
or too diffuse. To demand that long-established institutions be
justified on the basis of empirical studies is to confuse the capabilities
of social science with wisdom.
Consider, more fundamentally, the demand that the purposes of
traditional marriage be analyzed in isolation from one another, that is,
as separate from or outside the activity of marriage as a whole. When,
for instance, reformers say that homosexual couples are as capable of
love as are heterosexuals, they are not speaking of exactly the kind of
love that traditional marriage encourages and honors. That kind of

22. See Stewart, supra note 18, at 329.
23. See Eugene Volokh, Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 1155, 1179 (2005).
24. See Mark Strasser, Family, Definitions, and the Constitution: On the
Antimiscegenation Analogy, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 981,997-98 (1991).
25. See Michael S. Wald, Same-Sex Couple Marriage:A Family Policy Perspective, 9
VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 291, 298 (2001).
26. See generally David K. Flaks, Gay and Lesbian Families: Judicial Assumptions,
Scientific Realities, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345 (1994) (discussing common
misconceptions about homosexuals and arguing that gay parents are as competent as
heterosexual parents).
27. See generally M.V. LEE BADGETT, WILL PROVIDING MARRIAGE RIGHTS TO
SAME-SEX COUPLES UNDERMINE HETEROSEXUAL MARRIAGE? EVIDENCE FROM
SCANDINAVIA
AND THE NETHERLANDS
(2004),
available at
http://www.iglss.org/media/filesfbriefing.pdf.

28.

See Teresa Stanton Collett, Recognizing Same-Sex Marriage: Asking for the
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love, obviously, is the kind that is based on the physical and emotional
complementarity that the two sexes can provide one another.
Similarly, when it is said that homosexuals can raise children, the
understanding of child-rearing implicit in the activity of traditional
marriage is changed.29 That understanding, again, is based on the
observation that men and women have somewhat different instincts
on matters like discipline, risk-taking, and nurturing.
Even stating two of the purposes of traditional marriage in this
way, as simple instrumental objectives, distorts them. Traditional
marriage laws do not embody a judgment that gender differences are
necessary for either love or child-rearing. Rather, they embody the
judgment that the relationships such differences make possible are
morally and psychologically preferable and, thus, should be officially
acknowledged, rewarded to a degree, honored, and encouraged. The
tangible benefits associated with marriage have to be understood in
this light. Homosexual couples may need these financial and legal
benefits, but what proponents of homosexual marriage must establish
in addition is that homosexual couples are as entitled as heterosexuals
to the public recognition and respect that is an aspect of these legal
entitlements.
The issue, then, is not simply whether homosexuals can raise
children well, can have loving relationships with one another, or
would benefit from various legal entitlements. To a large extent they
can do all that now. The issue is whether the state should hold out
homosexual relationships for honor and encouragement in the same
way that it holds out the relationships of heterosexuals. Whether
gender differences are relevant to morality, aesthetics, psychology, or
family dynamics are questions that may be exasperating for some, but
recent changes in attitudes towards homosexuality do not alter the
fact that in many times and in many places people have strongly
believed that the differences between men and women are profoundly
and especially valuable. This is why, needless to say, the activity of
marriage affords special status to heterosexual relationships in a rich
context of cultural activities-including courtship patterns, music,
literature, clothing, religious beliefs, and innumerable other facets of
life-that idealize heterosexual romance leading to marriage.
Without a similar level of cultural support, it is at least
questionable whether legal authorization of homosexual marriage
Impossible?, 47

CATH. U. L. REV. 1245, 1249-50 (1998).
29. See George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of TraditionalMarriage,15 J.L. & POL. 581,
595 (1999).
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would succeed in extending public recognition and respect to
homosexual relationships. It is for this reason, of course, that some
traditionalists fear that gay marriage would eventually devalue
marriage as an institution, especially as an institution primarily for
raising children. But another possibility is that while all marriages,
both gay and straight, would outwardly involve the same rights and
obligations, many people would privately view homosexual marriage
as in fact being different and less significant. In this event, despite
identical legal forms, two types of marriage would exist in fact. Even
more insidiously, homosexuals might suspect that their marriages
were not actually respected no matter what private attitudes were. In
either event, society would bear the risks involved in altering a
foundational institution while the psychic gains sought would not
materialize.
Understanding marriage as an activity long conducted within
many other social practices, then, raises a quintessentially
conservative question. Rather than seeking a radical alteration in a
pivotal institution like marriage, might it not be wiser, and in the
longer run more effective, to attempt gradually to change more
peripheral aspects of the culture so that any reformulation of marriage
that eventually occurs will seem, to the bulk of Americans, to be a
natural extension of what is already known and accepted?

